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For many yeazs, stock market analysts have argued that value strategies
outperform the market (Graham and Dodd, 1934). These value strategies call for
buying stocks that have low prices relative to earnings, dividends, historical prices,
book assets or other measures of value. In recent years,, value strategies have
attracted academic attention as well. Basu (1977); Jaffe, Keün, and Westerfleld
(1989); Chan, Hamao, and Lakonishok (1991); and Fan]a and French (1992*) have
shown that stocks with high earnings price ratios earn higher returns. De Bondt and
Thaler (1985, 1987) have argued that extreme losers outperform the market over the
subsequent several years. Despite considerable criticism (Chan, 1988; and Ball and
Kothari, 1989), their analysis has generally stood up to the tests (Chopra,
Lakonishok, and Ritter, 1992). Rosenberg, Reid, and Lanstein (1984) show that
stocks with high book relative to market values of assets outperform the market.
Further work (Chan, Hamso, and Lakomshok, 1991; Fama and French, 1992*), has
both extended and refined these results. Finally, Chan, Hamao, and Lakonishok
(1991) show that a high ratio of cash flow to price also predicts higher returns.
Interestingly, many of these results have been obtained for both the U.S. and Japan.
Certain types of value strategies, then, appear to beat the market.
While there is some agreement that value strategies work, the interpretation
of why they work is more controversial. Value strategies might work because they
are contrarian to naive2 strategies followed by other investors. These naive
strategies might range from extrapolating past earnings growth too far into the
future, to assuming a trend in stock prices, to overreacting to good or bad news, or
to simply equating a good investment with a well-run company irrespective of price.
Regardless of the reason, some investors tend to get overly excited about stocks that
have done very well in the past, buy them up, and these glainour stocks become
2What we call naive strategies is also sometimes referred to as upopular
models (Shiller, 1984) and anoise (Black, 1986).4
overpriced. Similarly, they overreact to stocks that have done very badly, oversell
them, and these out-of-favor value stocks become underpriced.Contrazian
investors bet against such naiveinvestors. Because contrarian strategiesinvest
disproportionately in stocks that are underpriced, and undennvest in stocks that are
overpriced, they outperform the market (sec De Bondt and Thaler, 1985).
An alternative explanation of why value strategies work, argued most
forcefully by Fama and French (1992), is that they are fundamentally riskier. That
is, investors in valuestocks,such as high book to market stocks, tend to bear higher
fundamental riskof some sort, andtheirhigheraverage returns arc simply
compensation for this risk. This argument was also used bycriticsofDcBondtand
Thater (Chan, 1988; and BaIL and Kothaii, 1989) to dismiss the overreactionstory.
Whether value strategies work because they are contrarian to naive strategiesor
because they are fundamentally riskier remains anopen question.
In this paper, we try to shed further light on the two potentialexplanations
for why value strategies work. We do so along two directions. First,we examine
more closely the predictions of the contrarian model. In particular, one natural
version of the contrarian model argues that the overpriced Liamour stocksare those
which, first, have performed well in the past, and, second, arcexpected by the
market to perform weli in the future. Similarly, theunderpriced out-of-favor or
value stocks arc those that have performed poorly in thepast and arc expected to
continue to perform poorly. Value strategies that betagainst those investors who
extrapolate past performance produce superior returns. In principle, this version of
the contrarian model is testable becausepast performance and expectation of future
performance are two separate and separately measurable characteristics ofglamour
and value.
In this paper, past performance is measuredusing information on past
growth in sales, earnings, operating income, and cash flow, andexpected
performance is measured by multiples of price to current earnings,operating income,
and cash flow. We then examine the predictions of the contrarianmodel, namely
that out-of-favor or value stocks indeedoutperform glamour stocks. We start with5
simpleone-way classifications of glamour and value that rely on ieasuresof either
past growth or expected future growth. We then move on to the more theoretically
justified classifications in which glamour and value are defined using both past
growth 4currentmultiples. In addition, we compare past, expected, and future
growth of glamour (and value) stocks to see if their expected growth rates are similar
to past growth rates and higher (lower) than actual future growth rates, as our
version of the contrarian model predicts. We show that a wide range of value
strategies produce higher returns, and that the pattern of returns, and of past,
expected, and actual growth rates are consistent with the contrarian model.
The second question we ask is whether value stocks are indeed
fundamentally riskier than glamour stocks. To be fundamentally riskier, value stocks
must underperform glamour stocks with some regularity, and particularly in the
states of the world when the margmal utility of consumption is high. This view of
risk motivates our tests. We look at the frequency of superior (and inferior)
performance of value strategies, as well as at their performance in bad states of the
world, such as extreme down markets and economic recessions. We also look at the
betas and standard deviations of value and glamour strategies. We find little if any
support for the view that value strategies are fundamentally riskier.
Our results raise the obvious question of how the higher expected returns
on value strategies could have continued if such strategies are not fundamentally
riskier?
We present some possible explanations that rely both on behavioral strategies favored
by individual investors and on agency problems plaguing institutional investors.
The next section of the paper briefly discusses our methodology. Section
Ill examines a variety of one variable measures of glamour and value, including
book to market ratio, cash flow to price ratio, earnings to price ratio, and past
growth in sales. It shows that virtually all contrai-ian strategies produce excess
returns, and motivates our subsequent use of measures of past and expected growth
in combination. Section IV then examines the performance and other characteristics
of theoretically superior contrarian strategies that are defined using both past growth6
and current multiples. It shows that theoretically motivated contrazian strategies
produce higher returns than more ad hoc classifications, such as book to market.
These value strategies outperform glamour strategies by 8 percent peryear.
Moreover, the superior performance of value stocks relative to glamour stocks does
not diminish if we restrict our attention to the 50percentor 20 percent largest stocks
by market capitalization. Section V provides evidence that contrarian strategies work
because they exploit the extrapolation mistakes reflected in stock prices.
Specifically, the expected growth of glamour stocks relative to value stocks implicit
in their relative multiples significantly overestimates actual future growth. Section
VI examines risk characteristics of these value strategies and provides evidence that
over longer horizons value strategies outperform glamour strategies almost always,
and do particularly well in bad states of the world. This evidence providesno
support for the hypothesis that value strategies are riskier. Finally, section VII
attempts to interpret our findings.
Ii. METflODOLOGY
The sample period covered in this study is from the end of April, 1963, to
the end of April, 1990. Some of our formation strategies require Syears of past
accounting data. Consequently, we look at portfolios formed every year starting at
the end of April, 1968. We ex.mine subsequentperformance and other
characteristics of these portfolios for up tosyeazs after formationusing returns data
from CRSP and accounting data from COMPUSTAT(including the research file).
The universe of stocks is NYSE and AMEX. Since werequire 5yearsof past data
before including a company in the sample, the survival bias inherent in theway that
COMPUSTAT adds companies to its data base is to a large extent avoided(Banz and
Breen, 1986).
Within each of our groups such as deciles based on book-to-market ratios,
we equally weight all the stocks. For each of our portfolios, wecompute returns
using a buy-and-hold strategy for years +1, +2,..., +5relativeto the time of
formation. If a stock disappears from CRSP duringa year, its return is replaced7
until the end of the year with the return on a corresponding size decile portfolio. At
the end of the year, the portfolio is rebalanced and each surviving stock gets the
same weight. (A stock that disappeared in the previous year is no longer part of the
portfolio.) We also computed the results for 50%and20% of the largest finns in
our universe. Such resuJts are more indicative of realistic investment opportunities,
especially for institutional investors. Moreover, focusing on larger firms avoids
potential selection biases in the COMPUSTAT data base.
For most of our results, we present size-adjusted returns. To adjust for
size, we first identify, for every stock in the portfolio, its size decile at the formation
time. We then construct a size reference portfolio so that for every stock in the
original portfolio we have a benchmark which is its size reference portfolio. At the
end of each year, we recompute the market capitalization for each stock and update
its size affiliation to obtain a more current size benchmark. In computing the return
on the benchmark portfolio we assume an annual buy-and-hold strategy. The annual
size-adjusted return on the original portfolio is then computed as the return on that
portfolio minus the return on the size reference portfolio.
In addition to returns for the various portfolios, we compute growth rates
and multiples for accounting measures such as sales, earnings, cash flow and
operating income.All accounting variables are taken from COMPUSTAT.
Earnings are measured before extraordinaiy items, cash flow is defined as earnings
plus depreciation, and operating income is defined as earnings before interest, taxes,
and depreciation.
Let us illustrate our procedure for computing growth rates using the case of
sales. To compute the growth of sales in year -3 relative to formation, we consider
a portfolio that invests $1 in each stock, and look at the sales generated by this
portfolio in years -4 and -3, and use the percentage change as our growth measure.
In this fashion, we compute the growth in sales for every year prior and post
formation. The S-year growth rates we present are annual geometric average growth
rates. This procedure is appealing because it computes growth rates in accounting
measures in the same way as stock returns are computed. i.e., it gives each company8
the same weight at the start of each year. Moreover, this portfolio approach to
calculating growth rates avoidstheproblems with outliers and with negative base
year values present in the more traditional approach where growth rates are
computed for each stock and then averaged.
Finally, we compute several accounting ratios, such as cash flow to price
and earnings to price. These ratios are also used to classify individual stocks into
different portfolios. For these classifications, we consider only stocks with positive
ratios of cash flow to price or earnings to price because negative ratios cannot be
interpreted as reflecting expected growth rates. For purposes other than classifying
individual stocks into portfolios, these ratios are computed for the entire equally-
weighted portfolios, without eliminating negative values. For example, we compute
the total cash flow to price ratio for each stock and then take the average for the
relevant sample. This strategy gives us the cash flow per $1 invested in a portfolio
where each stock receives the same weight. Negative ratios for individual stocks do
not present any special problems.
ifi.SIMPLE GLAMOUR AND VALUE STRATEGIES
Table 1 presents the returns on a strategy that has received a lot of attention
recently (Fama and French 1992a), namely the book to market strategy. We divided
the universe of stocks annually into book to market deciles, where book value ii
taken from COMPUSTAT for the end of the previous fiscalyear, and market value
is taken from CRSP as the market value of equity at portfolio formation time. In
general in this paper, we focus on long horizon returns (ofup to 5years)on various
strategies. The reason for looking at such long horizons is that we arc interested in
performance of alternative investment strategies over horizons suitable for long term
investors. Moreover, we assume annual buy and hold periods in contrast tomonthly
buy and hold periods assumed in most previous studies. Because of various market
microstructure issues as well as execution costs, our procedure produces returns that
are closer to those that investors can actually capture.
In Panel A of Table 1, we present the size-adjusted returns foryears 19
through 5after the formation (AB1 through AB5),theaverage size-adjusted annual
return (AAB), the size-adjusted 5 year return (CAB5), and the compounded 5 year
rawreturn (C5).Thenumbers presented are the averages across all formation
periodsin the sample. The results confirm and extend the results establishedby
RosenbergCt al(1984), ChanCt a! (1991),andFama and French(1992a). On
averageoverthe post-formation years, the low BM (glamour) stocks have an
abnormal returnof -4.3 percentand the high BM (value) stocks have theabnormal
returnof 3.5 percent, a difference of 7.8 percent per year. The extra return on
value stocks relative to glamour stocks is 4.5 percent in the first year, 8.3 percent
in the second year, 6.7 percent in the third year, 9.9 percent in the fourth year, and
9.8 percent in the fifth year. If portfolios are held with the limited rebalancing
described above, then cumulatively value stocks outperform glamour stocks by 38.7
percent over years 1 through 5. Without adjusting for size, glamour stocks earned
a five year return of 56.5 percent versus 112.1 percent for value stocks. There is
little doubt that, during this time period, the BM value strategy substantially
outperformed the glamour strategy.
The real question is what does the BM ratio really capture? Unfortunately,
many different factors are reflected in this ratio. A low BM may describe a
company with a lot of intangible assets, such as R&D capital, that are not reflected
in the accounting book value because R&D is expensed. A low BM can also
describe a company with attractive growth opportunities that do not enter the
computation of book value, but do enter the market price. Also, a natural resource
company, such as an oil producer without good growth opportunities but with high
temporary profits, might have alowBM after an increase in oil prices. A stock
whose risk is low and future cash flows are discounted at a low rate would have a
low BM as well. Finally, a low BM may describe an overvalued glamour stock.
The point here is simple: book to market is not a clean variable uniquely
identifiable with economically interpretable characteristics of the firms.
The more important of such economically interpretable characteristics are
the market's expectations of futuregrowthand the past growth of these firms. To10
proxy for expected growth, we use multiples of various measures of profitability to
price, so that firms with lower multiples have higher expected growth. The idea
behind this is Gordon's formula that C/P =r-g,where C is cash flow, P is price,
r is discount rate and g is the expected growth rate of cash flow. A similar formula
applies to dividends, earnings, and operating income, except that their own
respective expected discount and growth rates should be used. According to this
formula, holding discount rates constant,3 a high C/P firm has a low expected
growth rate of cash flow, while a low C/P firm has a high expected growth rate of
cash flow, and similarly for the ratio of dividends to price (DP), or cash flow to
price (CP), and of operating income to price (OP).4 In addition to expected growth
rates, we look at actual past growth rates of sales (SG), earnings (EU), operating
income (OG) and cash flow (CU). Because the book to market ratio does not
disentangle the past and the future growth, we look at variables that estimate the past
and the future growth separately.
Panel B of Table I presents the current multiples and past growth rates of
BM portfolios. The various multiples are in general much higher for value stocks
than for glamour stocks. For example, the extreme glamour stocks have a cash flow
to price ratio of .059,whichis about one-third as large Is this ratio for extreme
value stocks (.172). This indicates that the expected growth in cash flow is much
higher for glamour stocks than for value stocks, or, put differently, that glamour
stocks are 3 times more expensive per dollar of cash flow than value stocks. But in
some cases, the most extreme value stocks have lower multiples than the less
extreme value stocks. For example, the EP ratio of the extreme BM value portfolio
is the lowest. This might be explained by the fact that the BM value portfolio
31n section VI, wecompare risk characteristics, and hence appropriate
discount rates, of the various portfolios.
4Because of leverage, operating income is not aprecise measure of cash
flow that accrues to shareholders. Consequently, we use OP multiples across firms
as only a rough indicator of differences in expected growth of operating income.11
contains manystockswhose earnings are temporarily depressed, but are expected to
recover at least partially. The high expected growth rate of earnings of high BM
stocks suggests that BM is not an ideal way to define a contrarian strategy. Looking
at five year past growth of BM deciles shows that low BM (glamour) stocks have
higher past growth rates than high BM (value) stocks. For example, the past growth
rate of cash flow is 26.9 percent per year higher for glamour stocks. The same
pattern works for operating income (see also Fama and French, 1992b). The results
on past growth suggest that the BM strategy is similar to a contrarian strategy in that
it picks stocks with low past growth and avoids stocks with high past growth.
In light of the ambiguity of the interpretation of BM, we move on to
measures of expected future growth rates and past growth rates as perhaps more
direct ways to identify glamour and value stocks. Table 2 presents the results of
sorting on the ratio of cash flow to price (CP). High CP stocks are identified with
value stocks because their growth rate of cash flow is expected to be low, or,
alternatively, their prices are low per dollar of cash flow. Conversely, low CP
stocks are glamour stocks. On average, over the 5 post-formation years, first decile
C? stocks have an abnormal return of -4.9 percent per annum, whereas the tenth
docile CP stocks have an abnormal return of 3.9 percent per annum, for a difference
of 8.8 percent. Over the five year horizon, the difference in cumulative abnormal
returns between lowest CP and highest CP portfolios is 42.9 percent, and that in
cumulative raw returns is 95.1 percent. Sorting on C? is thus a more effective value
strategy by itself than sorting on book to market. If nothing else, this result shows
that there is nothing unique about BM as the basis for either a contrarian value
strategy or for a high expected return strategy.
The characteristics of C? deciles are similar to those of BM deciles.
Multiples basically line up with BM and increase with C? deciles. The results on
past growth are also in general consistent with glamour stocks having a superior past
performance relative to value stocks, although CP docile 1 stocks do not have the
highest past growth. This suggests that the low C? docile contains many stocks that
have had low growth in the past but are expected to recover, which are not the12
stocks which a contrarian strategy would pick out. Sorting on CP atone thus does
not give us a strategy that is always contrarian to extrapolation either.
An alternative popular multiple is the earnings price ratio, EP. Table 3
presents the results for EP. On average, over the S post-formation years, first decile
EP stocks have an abnormal return of -3.5 percent, and tenth decile EP stocks have
an abnormal return of 1.9 percent, for an average difference of 5.4 percent. Over
the five year horizon, this difference in abnormal returns cumulates to 26.3 percent,
whereas the cumulative difference in raw returns is 67.1 percent. Low EP stocks
underperform high EP stocks by a fairly wide margin, although the difference is not
as large as that between extreme BM or CP deciles. One possible reason for that
is that earnings are very noisy and often negative, which makes EP a poor proxy for
identifying glamour and value stocks.
An alternative way to get at glamour and value is to classify stocks based
on past growth. The extrapolation story, as well as the evidence discussed above,
suggests that stocks with high past growth are typically glamour stocks, and stocks
with low past growth are out-of-favor or value stocks. We measure past growth by
growth in sales, GS, which is less volatile and less often negative than either growth
in cash flow or growth in earnings, particularly for stocks in the extreme portfolios
that we are most interested in. Still, sorting stocks into dediles by past growth rates
of sales is somewhat complicated. To reduce the noise fromyear-to-year sales
growth volatility, our classification of stocks into GS dediles is based on average
rank of their sales growth, rather than the raw growth number. Specifically, for
each company for each of years -1,
-2, ...,-5prior to formation we calculated the growth of sales in that year. Then,
for each year, we rank all companies by growth in sales for thatyear. For each
company, we then compute its weighted average rank, giving the weight of 5 to its
growth rank in year -I, the weight of 4 to its growth rank in year -2, etc. Finally,
we form deciles based on each stock's weighted average growth of sales rank. This
procedure is a crude way to both pick out stocks with consistently high past growth13
in sales, and to give greater weight to more recent sales growth in ranking stocks.3
Table 4 presents the results for the GS strategy. On average, over the S
post-formation years, the low oS strategy earns an abnormal return of 2.2 percent,
and the high GS strategy earns the abnormal return of -2.4 percent. The cumulative
difference in size-adjusted returns over five years is 22.7 percent, and that in raw
returns is 61.6 percent. The value strategy outperforms the glamour strategy, on
average, in each of the 5post-formationyears. These magnitudes are not as
dramatic as those for the BM and CP strategies, but show clearly that a GS-based
strategy can predict returns. Note that when we confine ourselves to the largest 50%
ofall firms in Table 8, the GS strategy works aswellas the BM strategy.
An examination of the characteristics of GS decile portfolios reveals several
interesting results. First, low GS stocks have anannualizedsales growth of -3.5
percentover 5yearsprior to formation, compared to 12.5 percent for high GS firms.
The multiples generally rise as GS rises, except for decile ten where the multiples
typically fall. Some of the fastest past growth stocks are expected to slow down and
hence have relatively low multiples, which suggests that sorting on GS alone is,
again, not an ideal contrarian strategy. The pattern of other past growth measures
across GS deciles largely follows the pattern of GS. In sum, sorting on GS alone
gives us a strategy that works as a value strategy, but does not necessarily coincide
with an ideal contrarian strategy. This is exactly what we would expect.
The results in this section suggest several conclusions. First, a variety of
value strategies, based on both multiples and past growth rates, produce superior
returns. There is nothing special about the book to market strategy or any other
individual measure of value. Second, the one way classification strategies do not
appear to be the best way to identify glamour and value stocks, since they often
bunch true glamour and value stocks with temporary winners and losers. For
5We have also tried a procedure in which we did not give the growth rate
in more recent years a higher weight in the ranking, and obtained very similar
results.14
example, lowEP stocks,whicharesupposedly glamour stocks, includemanystocks
with temporarily depressed earnings.These results point to the need for a
theoretically better definition of glamour and value, which takes account of both past
growth and expectations of future growth.
IV. ANATOMY OF A CONTRARIAN STRATEGY
Performance of Contrarian $trate2jes
Formarket participants to extrapolate the perfonnance of a given stock, they
must expect its future performance to be similar to past performance. This means
that a glamour stock would be a stock with high growth in the past expected
continued high growth in the future. In this section, we continue to associate high
multiples of prices to earnings (dividends, operating income, or cash flow) with high
expected growth rate. Thus a glamour stock must have both high past growth and
a high multiple, not just one of these. A glamour stock must be distinguished from
a temporary loser, which had low growth in the past but is expected to recover and
hence has a high multiple. A glamour stock must also be distinguished from a
temporary winner, which had high growth in the past but is expected to slow down
and hence has a low multiple. A value stock must have had low growth in the past
and be expected by the market to continue to grow slowly, giving it a low multiple.
The principle behind the contrai an strategy is that glamour stocks are overpriced and
value stocks are underpriced given their risk characteristics, and hence an investor
should buy value stocks and sell glamour stocks. The question is: do such
theoretically motivated contrarian strategies work better?
Table 5presentsthe results for the strategy that sorts on both GSandCP.
Since we are sorting on two variables, sorting stocks into dediles on each variable
is impractical. Accordingly, we independently sort stocks into threegroups (bottom
30%, middle 40% and top 30%) by GS and by CP, and then take intersections
resulting from the two classifications.Because the classifications are done
independently, extreme glamour and value portfolios (high GS, low CP and low GS,
high C?) contain greater than average numbers of stocks since GS and CP are15
negatively correlated. The extreme glamour portfolio has the highest GS and the
lowest CP rank, and the extreme valueportfoliohas the lowest GS and the highest
CP rank. These portfolios are listed in the first and last columns of Table 5.
Inan average post-formation year in this sample, the glamour portfolio had
an abnormal size-adjusted return of -3.3 percent, and the value portfolio had the
abnormalreturnof 5.4 percent. for a difference of 8.7 percent per year. Inpost-
formation year is the average difference in returns between the extreme portfolios
below 8 percent! Over the five post-formation years, the cumulative difference in
abnormal returns is 46 percent, and the cumulative difference in raw returns is 99.9
percent. This difference in returns between the value and the glamour strategies
seems to us to be very large. It is larger, in particular, than the difference predicted
by the BMstrategyorby theCP strategy alone. Interestingly, both CP and GS
contributea great deal of explanatory power in these bivariate classifications. For
example, low CP stocks with low past sales growth, which we don't define as
glamour stocks, yield a positive abnormal return of .005,butlow CP stocks with a
high past sales growth, which we do define as glamour stocks, have a future
abnormal return of -.029.
Table 6 presents the results for a classification using both past growth rate
in sales and the earnings to price ratio. The average difference in returns over the
5yearperiod between the two extreme portfolios is now 7.7 percent 1year,which
cumulatively amounts to 38.6 percent over 5yearsin size-adjusted returns and 104.2
percent in raw returns. The EP XGSstrategy works much better than either the EP
alone or the GS alone strategy, although not quite as well as the CP X GS strategy.
By comparing these returns to the low EP low GS group, and the high EP high GS
group, it is clear that both EP and GS contribute to a better selection of glamour and
value stocks. Moreover, even though the results from sorting on EP alone were not
very strong, the combination of EP and GS works almost as well as CP and GS,
which suggests that in combination with a variable that distinguishes past losers and
past winners, such as GS, the EP variable in fact separates glamour stocks from
value stocks successfully.16
Table 7 presents returns and other characteristics for portfolios classified by
BM and growth in sales. The results show that growth in sales has significant
explanatory power for returns even after sorting by BM. For example, within the
set of firms whose SM ratios are the highest, the average difference in returns
between the low sales growth and high sales growth subgroups is over 3% per year
(4.1% vs. .9%). A similar result holds for the other two groups sorted by BM.
Note that these results do not appear to be driven by the role of the superimposed
GS classification in creating a more precise partition of the firms by BM. The BM
ratios across GS subgroups arc not very different.
In summary, the results of this section have established two propositions.
First, the amounts by which theoretically justified value strategies outperform
glamour strategies arc extremely large.. In many cases, they arc on the order of 7
to 8 percent per year, and persist for several years. Given the failure of standard
fundamental risk measures to explain even small differences in returns, it is hard to
believe that 7 to 8 percent a year can be explained by risk. Second, the results
suggest that strategies explicitly constructed to be contrarian to extrapolation of past
growth produce higher abnormal returns than more ad hoc value strategies, such as
that based on book-to-market. This result suggests that value strategies might indeed
work because they are contrarian, rather than for some other reason.
Do these results apply as well to lar2e stocks?
One objection to this analysis is that, even though we corrected the returns
for size, the superior returns of value stocks over glamour stocks might come from
the smaller stocks. Larger firms, however, are of greater interest for implementable
trading strategies, especially for institutional investors. These firms are more closely
monitored, and hence might be more efficiently priced. Moreover, various market
microstructure biases in CRSP tapes and selection biases in COMPUSTAT tapes
should not be an issue with larger stocks.
Table 8 presents the summary of the previous analysis for the largest 50
percent of our firms. Ourpreviousresults still hold for every method of sorting17
stocksinto glamourand value, andTable8illustrates thatfor GS, CP,cp x Gs,
BM, EP, and EP X GS. For theBMclassification, the average difference in ret.irns
betweenglamour andvalue during the post-formation penod is 6.7 percent per year.
ThisdifferencefortheCP X GSclassification is8.7percentper year, which is the
sameasthat obtained forallstocks.For the EP XGS classification, the difference
inaveragereturnsis 8.3percentper year.
We have also donetheanalysis for the largest 20 percent of the stocks,
which effectively mimics the S&P 500, and got a very similar spreaiofreturns
between glamourandvaluestocks.Theconclusionis clear: our results apply to the
largest stocks as well.
ReEression Analysis
Previous analysis has identified a variety of variables that can define
glamour and value portfolios. In this section, we ask which of these variables are
significant in a multiple regression. Table9presents the results of regressions of
raw returns on the characteristics of stocks that we have identified. Recall that, in
our analysis, we have 22 portfolio formation periods. We run regressions separately
for each post-formation year, starting with + 1 and ending with +5.Thus,for post-
formation year + 1, we run 22 separate cross-sectional regressions in vich the
dependentvariable isthe annual return on stock i and the independent variables are
characteristics of stock i. Then using the Farna-MacBeth (1973)procedure,the
coefficients for these 22 cross-sectional regressions are averaged and the t-statistics
are computed. We similarly run 22 regressions for year +2, +3, +4 and +5after
the formation. The results presented in Table9areforthe year +1.
We use the ratios of cash flow to price and of earnings to price in the
regression analysis. However, for many stocks these ratios are negative, and hence
cannot be plausibly interpreted as expected growth rates. We deal with this problem
in the same way as Fama and French (1992a). Specifically, we define variables
CP + and EP + which are equal to zero when CP and EP are negative, and are equal
to CP and EP when they are positive. We also include in the regressions dummies,18
called DCP and DEP, which take the value of 1 when CP and EP are negative,
respectively. This approach presents a crude way to treat observations with negative
EP and CP differently than observations with positive EP and CP.
The first result emerging from Table 9 is that, taken separately, each of GS,
SM EP and C?, although not SIZE, have a statistically significant predictive power
on returns. These results are in line with Fama and French (1992a), although on a
stand alone basis C? and not BM is the most significant variable. When we use the
dependent variables in combination, the weakness of BM relative to CP, EP and GS
begins to emerge, and its coefficient drops significantly. For example, when GS,
CP and BM are included in the same regression, the first two are significant, but BM
is not. Similarly, when GS, EP and BM are included inthesame regression, EP
and GS are significant, but BM is not. The variables that stand out in multiple
regressions are GS and CP, the value measures stressed in this paper.
V. A TEST OF THE EXTRAPOLATION MODEL
So far we have shown that strategies contrarian to extrapolation earn high
abnormal returns relative to the market and to extrapolation strategies. We have not,
however, provided any direct evidence that extrapolation is indeed what characterizes
glamour and value stocks. In this subsection, we provide such evidence. The
essence of extrapolation is that investors are excessively optimistic about glamour
stocks because they tie their expectations of future growth to past growth, and
excessively pessimistic about value stocks for the same reason. But if investors
make mistakes, these mistakes can presumably be detected in the data. A direct test
of extrapolation, then, is to look directly at actual future growth rates and to compare
them to the pj growth rates and to the expected growth rates as implied by the
multiples.
The information on past growth rates of sales, earnings, operating income
and cash flow has been provided already. Future growth rates of the same variables
can be computed in a similar fashion for years +1, +2,...,+5, andfor average
growth. We can also compute the difference in past or future growth rates between19
glamourand value stocks. To estimateexpected growthrates, we come back to
Gordons formula, which,for cash flow,takes the form,C/P= r - g, whereC/P
is theratioof cash flow to price, r is thediscountrate of cash flow, and g is the
expected growth rate of cash flow. Using this formula, the difference between
expected growth rates of cash flow of a glamour and a value stock is just the
difference in cash flow to price ratios of these two stocks, assuming that their
discount rates are the same, which we do for the moment. Similarly, we proxy for
the differences in expected growth rates of earnings and operating income by the
differences in earnings to price and operating income to price ratios.6 The ratio of
sales to price does not have the interpretation of an expected growth rate. Thus, for
cash flow, earnings, and operating income, we have a proxy for the difference in
cwected growth rates between value and glamour based on differences in respective
multiples.
Table 10 presents the results for two classifications of stocks, one based on
BM and one based on GS XCP.Starting with BM, the following patterns emerge
from The Table. First, as we know already, the past growth of glamour stocks by
any measure is much faster than that of value stocks. Second, the expected growth
rate of glamour stocks is usually higher than that of value stocks, although the
difference in expected growth rates is not as high as that of past growth rates. For
example, cash flow of glamour stocks has grown 26.9 percent faster than cash flow
of value stocks, but is expected to grow only 11.3 percent faster in the future. Also,
operating income of glamour stocks is expected to outgrow that of value stocks by
almost as much as it did in the past. In contrast, while earnings of glamour stocks
have grown much faster than earnings of value stocks in the past, the market expects
them to grow 2.5 percent slower in the future. Market participants thus expect
some, but far from complete, convergence of growth rates between glamour and
6R1l that operating income does not measure the cash flow accruing to
shareholders, and hence OP is not as theoretically adequate a variable in this analysis
asCP.20
valuestocks.
The moststriking result comes from thecomparison oftheseexpected
growth rates to actualgrowthrates. The latterrevealclearly, that, contrary to the
market's expectations, during the post-formation years, glamour stocks did not grow
faster than value stocks. For example, while cash flow of glamour stocks was
expected to grow 11.3 percent faster, it actually grew 3 percent slower. While
operating income was expected to grow 22.6 percent faster for glamour stocks, it
actually grew .4 percent slower. Most remarkably, while earnings of glamour stocks
were expected to grow 2.5percentslower than those of value stocks, in actuality
they grew 38.6 percent slower per year. The expected growth rates show that
market participants expect glamour stocks to outgrow value stocks in the future,
though not by as much as they have in the past, and price them accordingly.
Contrary to investors' expectations, however, there is little persistence in the growth
rates. Given their expectations, investors are disappointed in the performance of
glamour stocks relative to out-of-favor stocks. The results using the CP X GS
classification present a very similar picture. Again, glamour stocks have outgrown
value stocks in the past judging by any measure, including sales, earnings, operating
income and cash flow. The expectations of relative future growth rates are, if
anything, even more optimistic than the difference between past growth rates would
suggest. For example, cash flow of glamour stocks grew 15.8 percent faster than
that of value stocks, but, judging by the multiples, is expected to grow 19.9 percent
faster per year, and similarly for earnings and operating income. In practice,
glamour stocks indeed grow faster than value stocks, but not nearly as much faster
as expected. For example, the cash flow of glamour stocks grows only 2.7 percent
faster per year than that of value stocks, compared to the market's expectation of a
difference of 19.9 percent. Similarly, the difference in growth rates of earnuigs is
negligible, even though the market expects the earnings of glamour stocks to grow
6 percent faster. This result is very similar to that for the BM classification. The
market expects a much higher future growth rate from glamour than from value
stocks, and hence prices glamour stocks much higher than value stocks relative to21
their earnings, cash flow, etc. In fact, glamour stocks do not grow nearly as fast
relative to value stocks as the market expects, disappointing market participants.
One other interesting observation emerges from this comparison of expected
and actual future growth rates using the (JS X CP classification. That is. the
difference in the growth rates between glamour and value stocks in the first year
after the portfolio formation is large, particularly looking at earnings and operating
income. This difference however shrinks rapidly over time, and in many cases the
growth rate eventually becomes higher for value stocks. Similarly, if we compare
the future growth in sales to growth, we see the slow deterioration of the
relative performance of glamour stocks in all classifications. At the same time, if
we look at earnings, glamour stocks sometimes take a bath relative to value stocks
nght away. This evidence suggests that according to some measures the market's
belief about the continued superior growth of glamour stocks is valid in the short
run, even though for all measures the market is too optimistic about glamour stocks
in the long run.
In summary, the evidence in Table 10 is supportive of the extrapolation
model. The glamour stocks have historically grown fast in sales, earnings, cash
flow, and operating income relative to the value stocks. Market participants in
general expect these differential growth rates to continue, and in some cases to
widen, and price glamour stocks accordingly. In the short run, their expectations of
continued superior growth of glamour stocks is borne out according to some growth
measures, though for other growth measures the forecasts are too optimistic evenin
the short run. However, in the long run, the evidence shows quite clearly that
growth rates of glamour stocks either converge to the growth rates of value stocks,
or even overshoot them and become lower. This table suggests, then, that forecasts
tend to be tied to past growth rates, and at the same time tend to be far too
optimistic for glamour stocks relative to value stocks. This, of course, is precisely
what the extrapolation model would predict. In this respect, the evidence in Table
10 goes significantly beyond the customary evidence on returns in that it shows a
relationship between the past, the forecasted, and the actual future growth rates that22
is largely consistent with the predictions of the extrapolation model.
VI. ARE CONTRARIAN STRATEGIES RISKIER?
Two alternative theories have been proposed to explain why value strategies
produce higher returns. The first theory says that they do so because they are
contrarian to extrapolation. Section IV has produced evidence suggesting that indeed
valuestrategiesconstructed as contranan strategies produce higher returns than ad
hoc value strategies.Section V further showed that investors appear to be
extrapolating the past, even though the future does not warrant such extrapolation.
The second explanation of the superior returns to value strategies is that they expose
investors to greater systematic risk. In this section, we test this theory directly.
Value stocks would be fundamentally riskier than glamour stocks if, first,
they underperform glamour stocks in some states of the world, and second, those are
on average 'bad states, in which the marginal utility of consumption is high,
making value stocks unattractive to risk-averse investors. This simple theory
motivates our empirical approach.
To begin, we look at the consistency of performance of the value and
glamour strategies over time and ask how often value underperforms glamour. We
then check whether the times when value underperforms are recessions, times of
severe market declines or otbeiwise bad states of the world in which the marginal
utility of consumption is high. These tests do not provide much support for the view
that value strategies are fundamentally riskier. Finally, we look at some additional
standard measures of risk, such as beta and the standard deviation of returns, to
compare value and glamour strategies.
Table 11 presents the results on the consistency of the performance of the
value strategy relative to the glamour strategy. We consider differences in returns
between deciles (1,2) and (9,10) for GS, (9,10) and (1,2) for CP and BM, and
between groups (3,1) and (1,3) for GS x CP over 1, 3, and 5yearholding horizons
starting each year in the sample (1968, 1969, etC). The results in Table 11 are based
on raw returns. The results show that value strategies outperform glamour strategies23
quite consistently. Using a 1 year horizon, value outperformed glamour in 13 out
of 22 years using GS to classify deciles, in 17 out of 22 years using CP, in 19 out
of 22 using CP X GS, and in 17 out of 22 using SM. As we use longer horizons,
the consistency of performance of the value strategy relative to the glamour strategy
increases. Over a 5 year horizon, the value strategy does worse than glamour in
only 2 periods using the GS classification, and in NO periods using the CP, GS X
CP, or SM classifications. In this sample, over the 5 year horizon, the value
strategy was completely safe relative to the glamour strategy.
One could perhaps object to the raw return analysis since there are
differences in market capitalization between value and glamour stocks, and so the
size effect could be driving the results. Table 12 replicates the results in Table 11
using size-adjusted returns. Again, we see inferior performance of the value strategy
in only * few cases using the one year horizon, and in no instances using the 5 year
horizon unless GS is used as the sole classifier. The GS X CP strategy, which is our
preferred contrarian strategy, picks out a portfolio of value stocks that always
outperforms the portfolio of glamour stocks over a 5 year horizon. Incidentally, this
consistency result holds up also for both the iop 50 percent and the top 20 percent
of stocks by market capitalization.
Given that value stocks underperform infrequently, do they at least
underperform in recessions, when the marginal utility of consumption is high?
According to the NBER, there were four notable recessions during our sample
period: a mild one Dec 1969- Nov 1970, a very deep one Nov 1973- March 1975,
and also significant ones Jan 1980- Jul 1980 and Jul 1981- Nov 1982. An
examination of Table 11 shows that the value strategy did about the same or
somewhat better than glamour just before and during the 1970 recession, did much
better around the severe recession of 1973-1975, did somewhat though not a lot
worse in 1979-1980, and did significantly better in 198 1-1982. It is implausible to
conclude from this that value strategies do particularly badly in recessions, when the
marginal utility of consumption is especially high.
A second way to look at precisely the same question is to compare the24
perfónnance ofvalue andglamourportfolios inthe worstmonthsforthestock
marketas a whole. Table 13 presents the performance of our decile portfolios in
each of 4 states of the world; the 2S worst stock return months in the sample based
on the equally-weighted index, the remaining 88 negative months other than the 25
worst, the 122 positive months other than the 25 best, and the 25 best months in the
sample. The results in this table are clear. Using every single classification, the
value portfolio outperformed the glamour portfolio in the market's worst 25 months.
For example, using the OS XC? classification, the value portfolio lost an average
of 8.6 percent of its value in the worst 25 months, whereas the glamour portfolio lost
10.3 percent of its value. Similarly, using every single classification scheme, the
value portfolio outperformed the glamour portfolio the index in the months in
which the index declined. Using the OS X CP classification, the value portfolio lost
1.5 percent in the months when the index declines, compared to 2.9 percent for the
glamour portfolio, and 2.3 percent for the index itself. So the value strategy clearly
does better when the market falls. The value strategy performs most closely to the
glamour strategy in the 122 positive months otherthan the best2S. In the very best
months, the value strategy significantly outperforms the glamour strategy and the
index, but not by as much as it does when the market falls sharply. Overall, the
value strategy appears to do somewhat better than the glamourstrategy in all states
and significantly better in some states. If anything, the superior performance of the
value strategy is skewed toward negative return months rather than positive returns
months. The evidence in Table 13 thus shows that the valuestrategy does not
expose investors to greater downside risk.
We have already shown that value rarely underperforms glamour for
horizons of 1 year or more and that the few instances when it doesunderperform do
not typically coincide with recessions. We have also shown that the relative
performance of the value strategy is not worse in "bad" states as defined by large
stock market declines. On the other hand, perhaps there is stilla positive relation
between the relative return on the valuestrategy and the degree of prosperity in the
economy. Investigating this relation is akin to the approach taken by various APT25
researchers seeking to give their factors a basis in economic theory.
Tables 14 and 15 provide numbers analogous to those inTable13 except
now the states of the worldarerealizations of real GNP growth and changes in the
unemployment rate. The data are quarterly, so that we have 88 quarters in the
sample. These quarters are classified into 4 states of the world;theworst 10
quarters, the next worst 34 quarters, the best 10 quarters, and the next best 34
quarters. The quarterly returns on the various glamour and value portfolios are then
matched up with the changes in macro variables for one quarter ahead, since
evidence indicates that the stock market leads these variables by approximately one
quarter. Average quarterly returns for each portfolio are then computed for each
state.
The results in Tables 14 and 15 mirror the basic conclusions from Table 13;
namely, that the value strategy is not fundamentally riskier than the glamour
strategy. For every classification scheme, the value strategy performs at least as
well as the glamour strategy in each of the 4 states and substantially better in most
states. Unlike the results in Table 13, there is some tendency for the relative returns
on value to be higher in good states than in bad states, especially for extreme good
states. Roughly speaking, value stocks could be described as having higher up betas
and lower down betas than glamour stocks with respect to economic conditions.
Importantly, while the value strategy does disproportionately well in extreme good
times, its performance in extreme bad times is also quite impressive. Performance
in extreme bad states is often the last refuge of those claiming that a high return
strategy must be riskier, even when conventional measures of risk such asbeta and
standard deviation do not show it. Overall, the evidence indicates some positive
relation between relative performance of the value strategy and measures of
prosperity, but there are no significant traces of a conventional asset pricing
equilibrium in which the higher returns on the value strategy are compensationfor
higher fundamental risk.
Finally, Table 16 presents some summary risk characteristics of thedecile
portfolios using our four classifications. These risk measures arecalculated during26
the post-formation penod using annual measurement intervals. For the extreme
value and glamour portfolios especially, the pie-formation periods exhibit unusual
behavior and hence might result in biased risk measures (Ball and Kothaii, 1989).
For each of our portfolios, we have 22 annual observations on its return in the year
following the formation, and hence can compute the standard deviation of returns.
We also have corresponding returns on the value-weighted CRSP index and the risk
free asset, and hence can calculate a beta for each portfolio.
First, the betas of value portfolios with respect to the value weighted index
tend to be about .1 higher than the betas of the glamour portfolios. As we have seen
earlier, the high betas probably come from value stocks having higher up betas,
and that if anything the superior performance of the value strategy occurs
disproportionally during bad realizations of the stock market. Even if one takes
an unreasonably strong pro-beta position, the difference in betas of .1 can explain
the difference of returns of perhaps up to 1 percent per year, and surely not 8
percent that we find. The evidence on beta thus completes our findings that
systematic risk, no matter how measured, cannot explain the findings of this paper.
Table 16 also presents average annual standard deviations of the decile
portfolio returns. The results show that value portfolios have somewhat higher
standard deviations of returns than glamour portfolios. Using the CP XGS
classification,the value portfolio has an average standard deviation of returns of 24.1
percent relative to 21.6 for the glamour portfolio. Closer eximination reveals that
these differences in standard deviations may just be related to the differences in betas
we found or else to the differences in market capitalization of the firms in the
different portfolios. Judging from the average standard deviation of size-adjusted
returns, the value strategy looks no riskier than the glamour strategy, although both
are riskier than the more middle-of-the-road strategies. Fama and French (1992b)
obtain similar results for the BM strategy. Overall, it is hard to believe that the
small differences in standard deviations that we are finding can explain the 8 percent
per year difference in average returns.27
VII.SUMMARY ANDTILE INTERPRETATION OF TILE FINDINGS
The results in this paper establish (in varying degrees of detail) three
propositions. First, many different investment strategies that involve buying out-of-
favor (value)stocksoutperform glamour strategies and the market. Second, the
likely reason that these value strategies work so well relative to the glamour
strategies is the fact that the actual growth rates of earnings, sales etc of glamour
stocks relative to value stocks are much lower than they were in the past, or as the
multiples on those stocks indicate the market expects them to be. That is, market
participants appear to consistently overestimate future growth rates of glamour stocks
relative to value stocks. Third, using conventional approaches to fundamenta] risk,
value strategies appear to be less risky than glamour strategies. Reward for bearing
fundamental risk does not seem to explain higher average returns on value stocks
than on glamour stocks.
While one can never reject the metaphysical version of the risk story, in
which securities that earn higher returns must by definition be fundamentally riskier,
the weight of evidence suggests a more straightforward model. In this model, out
of favor (or value) stocks are underpriced relative to their risk and return
characteristics, and investing in them indeed earns abnormal returns.
This conclusion raises the obvious question: how can the 7-8% per year in
extra returns on value stocks have persisted for so long? One possible explanation
is that investors simply did not know about them. This explanation has some
plausibility in that quantitative portfolio selection and evaluation are relatively recent
activities. Most investors might not have been able, until recently, to perform the
analysis done in this paper. Of course, advocacy of value strategies is decades old,
going back at least to Graham and Dodd. But such advocacy is usually not
accompanied by detailed statistical work, and hence might not be entirely persuasive,
especially since many other strategies are advocated as well. Stilt, the ignoraIce
story is not completely convincing given the general popularity of value investing.
Another possible explanation is that we have engaged in data snooping, and
have just identified an ex post pattern in the data. Several of our results and other28
pieces of evidence are inconsistent with this hypothesis. First, we have shown that
the theoretically motivated valuestrategies work betterthan ad hoc value strategies.
There is no reason for this to be true if we just found an cx post pattern. Second,
we presented evidence indicating that investors inglamourstocks overestimate future
growth rates relative to those of value stocks. There is no reason why this prediction
would be true if we just found an ex post pattern. Third, and most important, the
contrarian model has been tested, and confirmed, using data from other countries,
such as Japan (Chan, Hamao, and Lakonishok, 1991). The same coincidence is less
likely to materialize in multiple countries.
We conjecture that the results in this paper can best be explained by the
preference of both individual and institutional investors for glamour strategies and
by their avoidance of value strategies. Below we suggest some reasons for this
preference, which might potentially explain the obsePved returns anomaly.
Individual investors might focus on glamour strategies for a variety of
reasons. First, they may make judgment errors and extrapolate past growth rates of
glamour stocks, such as WALMART or Home Depot, even when such growth rates
are highly unlikely to persist in the future. Putting excessive weight on recent past
history, as opposed to a rational prior, is a common judgment error in psychological
experiments, and not just in the stock market. Alternatively, individuals might just
equate well-run firms with good investments regardless of price. After all, how can
you lose money on Microsoft or Walmart? Indeed, brokers always recommend
"good" companies, with "steady" earnings and dividend growth.
Presumably, the institutional investors should be somewhat more free from
judgment biases and excitement about "good companies" than individuals, and so
should flock to value strategies. But for several reasons, institutional investors might
themselves prefer glamour stocks even if they were less afflicted by extrapolation
biases than individuals, which is far from certain. The reason is the agency context
of institutional money management (see Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1992).
For example, institutions might preler glamour stocks because they appear to be
"prudent" investments, and hence are easy to justify to sponsors, who erroneously29
equate good companies with good investments. Glamour stocks have done well in
the past, and are unlikely to become financially distressed in the near future, as
opposed to value stocks, which have previously done poorly and are more likely to
run into financial problems. Many institutions actually screen out stocks of
financially distressed firms, many of which are value stocks, from the universe of
stocks they pick. Indeed, sponsors (because they themselves extrapolate) might
consider glamour stocks to be safer than value stocks, even though, as we haveseen,
a portfolio of value stocks is actually less risky. The strategy of investing in
glamour stocks, while appearing prudent, is not prudent at all in that it earns a
lower expected return and is not fundamentally less risky. Nonetheless, theagency
problems between money managers and their sponsors would cause money managers
to tilt towards glamour stocks (Lakonishok et ii,1992).
Another important factor is that most investors have shorter time horizons
than are required for value strategies to consistently pay off. Many individuals look
for stocks that will earn them high abnormal returns within a few months, rather than
4 percent per year over the next five years. Institutional money managers often have
even shorter time horizons. They often cannot afford to underperform the index or
their peers for any non-trivial period of time, for if they do, their sponsors will
withdraw the funds. A value strategy that takes 3 to 5yearstopsy off but may
underperform the market in the meantime (have a large tracking error) might simply
be too risky for money managers from the viewpoint of career concerns. If a money
manager fears getting fired before a value strategy pays off, he will avoid using such
a strategy. When both individuals and institutional money managers prefer glamour
and avoid value strategies, value stocks will be cheap and earn a higher average
return.
Are the anomalous excess returns on value stocks likely to persist? It is
possible chat over time more investors will become convinced of the value of being
a contrarian with a long horizon and the returns to our strategies will fall. Perhaps
the recent move into disciplined quantitative investment strategies, evaluated based
only on performance and not on individual stock picks, will increase the demand for30
value stocks and reducethe agencyproblems that result in picking glamour stocks.
Finally, the rapidly growing mutual funds are likely to be important investors
pursuing value strategies, since they face less pressure to pick glamour stocks for
clients than are many investment advisors of pension funds. All of these factors
might reduce the future returns to value strategies as such strategies become less
con ti-a ri an
Perhaps the most interesting implication of the conjecture that many of the
glamour stock investors are money managers is that this may explain their inferior
performance. In an earlier paper, we have focused on the striking underperformance
of pension fund money managers relative to the market index (Lakonishok, Shleifer,
and Vishny, 1992). The large difference in returns on glamour and value can at
least in principle explain how money managers can underperform the market by over
100 basis points per year before accounting for management fees. By looking at the
actual portfolios of institutional money managers, one can find out whether they are
ovennvested in glamour stocks and underinvested in value stocks. We plan to do
that in a follow-up paper.31
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Economic Activity:457-498.TABLE I:Decile Returns and Characteristics Based on 8ool-Io-Ma,ket
Atthe end of •ath April between1968 and1989. 10 docile porifolios are formed based on the ratio of
end.of-previous-years-bool-value-of.equity-to-end-ot.Apfit-market.valu.-of.equity. All numbers
presented in th, table ar, averagesOver the22 formation periodscomputed for corresponding
porlfo4ios. ABi is the site-adjusted return in year i afterlormatson.iI,.. 5. MB isthe average
over5-posl.formation-years'-size-adjusted-return. CABS I, th. cumulative over 5-post-formatioo.years.
size-adjusted-ref urn. CS is th, cumulative over 5-post•formation.years'raw-return. BM, Size. ER. CR,
SR. OP. and DR. deftnod below, use end-ol-April-market.valu.-of.equity and pre-lorrnationyear.
accounting.BMis th, ratio of book-valueof..quity.lo-market.value-of.equdy. Size is the total-dollar
valu. of equity (in millions). EP is th. ratio of .a,nings-to-mariet.valu.-of.equity. CR is the ratio of
cash-ftow.to-mark.t-value-of-equity. SR i, th. ratio of sales-to-market-value-of-equity. OP is the ratio
of operating-income.to-rnarket-valu.-ot-equity. DR is h, ratio of dividends-to-market-value-of-equity.
GE. GC. CS, and GO refaf to pe-formation-5-year-averagegrowth rates of earnings, cash flow, sales.
and operating incom.. respectively.
A. RETURNS
Glamour Vakie
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
ABI -.022.019-.002 -.013 -.007 .011 .008 022 031 .023
AB2 -.047-.027 .003 .004 .011 .013 .020 .014 .030 .036
AB3 -.036-.021-.004 .009 .005 .009 .022 036 .026 .031
AB4 .055-.017-.016 .004 .016 .012 .027 .034 .045 .044
ABS -.056-.017 .003 .013 .008 .013 .04.6 .031 .032 .042
AAB -.043-.020-.003 .004 .006 .012 .024 .028 .033 .035
CABS -.199 -.098 -.016 .016 .032 .057 .128 .146 .175 .166
Cs .560 .602 .9731.045 1.082 1.1521.3201.375 1.449 1.4-62
B. CHARACTERISTICS OF DECILES
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
BM .225 .414 .556 685 .810 .9361.0821 270 1.548 1.988
Size 663.3563.6508.84-47.6430.3394.4386.5304.3209.2 120.0
ER .029 .059 .071 .079 .084 .089 .092 083 .066 .004
CR .059 .100 .124 .145 .158 .173 .186 .186 .187 .172
SR .993 1.4.62 1.881 2.1982.5172.8803.1923.9044.789 4.906
OP 116 .173 .212 .250 .274 300 .322 335 347 342
OR 012 .017 .022 027 .032 .036 .038 037 .033 .032
GE 309 .218 .185 .154 .126 099 083 .061 004 .274
GC 234 .186 .159 134 .108 092 079 064 035 -035
GS 091 .114 098 .092 .076 .070 066 .057 036 030
GO 203 .178 .148 126 .101 088 .079 068 050 026TABLE 2: Portfolio Returns and Characterishcs Based on Cash-Flow-to-Price
At the end of each April between 1968 and 1989, 10 decile portfolios are formed based on the ratio ol
previous-year s-cash.flow-to-end-ot.Ap,it-market-value-ol-equity. All numbers presented in the table are
averages over the 22 formation periods computed for corresponding portfolios. ABi is the size-
adpusted return wi year i after formation. iI 5. AAB is the average over S'posl-lormation-years'-
size-adjusted-return. CAB5 is the cumulative over S.post.tormation.yeas'-'size-adusted-retum. CS is
the cumulatNe over 5.post-forrrration-years'-raw-relurn. BM. Size. EP, CP, SP, OP. and OP. defined
below, use .nd-of-April-market-value-ol-equity and preformation-year-accounting. BM is th, ratio of
book.valueof-equily-tO-markel.Value-Of-eqUity. Size is th. total-dollar value of equity (in millions). EP
is th, ratio of .arnings.to-market-valu.-ol-equily. CP is th. ratio of cash-flow-to-markel-valu.-of-equity.
SP is th. ratio of saleslo-markel-value.ot-equity. OP is the ratio of operating.incom.-to.market-value-
ol..quity. OP is the ratio ol dividends1o-market-valu.-ol-equity. GE, GC. GS. and GO refer to pro-




1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
ABI .049 -.012-.002 .000 .010 .009 .014 .032 .035 .035
A82 -.061 -.030-015 .013 .013 .027 .031 .032 .028 .037
AB3 - 050-.024-.007 .012 .008 .029 .025 .033 .024 .032
AB4 -.042-.038-.007 .001 .009 014 .026 .032 .056 .051
AB5 .040-.023 .000 .002 .022 .015 .028 .041 .045 .037
AAB .049-.025•.006 .005 .013 .019 .025 .034 .037 .039
CABS -.220-.120 -.031 .027 .065 .097 .130 .181 .201 .209
C5 .543 .779 .9691,0741.1581.2061.283L406 1.476 1.494
B. CI-IARACTERISIICS OF DECILES
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
OM 526 563 680 .765 .851 .9451.0131.1281.265 1.502
Size 438.24633428.6421.4394.3 393.0 399.9 439.9407.5 263.3
EP 010 047 .062 .078 .089 .097 .106 .117 .127 .131
CP 04.4 081 .106 .126 .149 .171 .196 .226 .268 .345
SP 1371 1.479 1.9082.2562,5432.8663.2113.7154.410 6.317
OP 091 .141 .184 .219 .255 .287 .326 .373 .441 .575
OP 012 018 .021 .026 .030 034 .036 .038 .039 .034
GE .172 .177 .160 .t34 .123 .107 .106 .100 .095 051
GC 113 .150 .139 .120 .113 .096 .091 .090 .089 .082
CS 046 081 084 .085 .083 .073 .073 .071 069 .060
GO 108 142 132 .121 .110 093 .094 .067 087 .086TABL.E 3 Decile Returns and Characteristics Based on Earning-to-Price
Al th. end of each April between 1968 and 1989. 10 dec11, porilolios are formed based on the ratio of
previous year .amings to end'of-AprlI-market-valu.-o(-.quity. All numbers presented in the table are
averages overtti•22formation periods computed tor corresponding poitlolios. ABe is the size-
adust.d return In year i after formation. i — I 5. AAB is th, average over 5-post-formation.
years-slzeadjusted-r.lurn. CABS is h, cumulative over 5-pOst.formation-years.sIze-adjusle(j.r.turn
CS is the cumulativ. over S-post-lormation-years'-raw-r.turn. BM. Sue, EP. CP. SR. OP. and OP.
defIned below. us. end-of-April-market-value-ol.equityandpre-formation-year.accounting. BM is th.
ratio of boolc-valueof'equity-lo-market.value-ol-equi(y, Size is th,total-dollarvalue of equity (in
millions). EP Is th, ratio of earnings-to-market-valu.of-equity, CP Is the ratio of cash-flow-to-market.
value-of-equ*y. SR is th, ratio of sales.to-mark.t-valu.-ol-equity. OP is In. ratioof operating-Income-
to-markqt.valueol-.quity. OP is the ratio of dividends-to-market-value-o(.equity GE, CC. CS. and GO




1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 tO
ABI •.019-.012 -.001 -.007-.006 .012 .024 .030 .042 .012
A82 -.040-.025-.016 .001 .024 .018 .030 .029 .026 .012
A83 -.037-.023-.003 006 .007 .028 .021 .015 .011 .013
AB4 -.039-.028 -.011 -.006-.001 .000 .028 .028 .035 .036
ABS -.040-.030 -.011 .004 002 .009 .023 .028 .033 .024
-.035 -.024 -.009'.001 .005 .013 .026 .026 029 .019
CAB5 -.163-.113-.042-.003 .027 .069 .138 .138 .155 .100
C5 .717 .808 .953 1.031 1.10211681.370 1.3931446 1.386
B. CHARACTERISTICS OF DECILES
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 tO
SM .716 .642 .694 .744 .821 .896 .9821.072 1.184 1.401
Size 381.34839509.4499.7498.7437.1 445.7410,5391.4 275.3
EP .024 .049 .065 .079 .091 .102 .115 130 .149 .181
CR .092 106 .122 .140 .158 .176 .192 218 245 .307
SP 2.165 7.8952.0522.152 2.376 2.6642.94733393.816 5.336
OP .156 .172 .201 .231 .260 .293 .321 .366 .414 522
OP .013 .017 .022 .028 .032 .035 .037 040 040 038
GE .068 138 .144 126 .120 .117 .116 .119 .123 .139
CC .078 .122 124 .116 .111 .106 .107 106 .110 120
CS .040 .073 .083 083 .087 061 .079 080 080 977
GO .077 .115 .117 III .107 tOO .101 104 .103 .115TABLE 4 Portfolio Returns and Characteristics Based on Grow1h-in-Sale
Al the md of each April between 1968 and 1989. 10 dec11. portfolios .10 formed based on hi pie-
formation 5 year weighted average rank of sales growth. All numbers preseriled in the table are
averages over th• 22 formation periods computed 1w corresponding portlolios. ABi is the size-
adjusted return in year i after formation. II 5. AAB is the average over 5-post-lormation-years'-
sue-adjusted-return. CABS is the cumulatN. over 5-post-lormation-years-Cjze..adlusted.return. CS is
th. cumulative over 5-post-formalion-years-raw-relurn. BM, Size, EP, CP. SP. OP. and OP. defined
below, use .nd-of-ApriI-market-ValUe-Of-eqUity and preformation-year-accounting. BM is the ralio of
book-value-of..quity-to-market-valUi-OI-eqUity. Size is the folal-doltar valu, of equity in millions). EP
is the ratio of earnings-to-market-value-of-equity CP is the ratio of cash-ltow-to--market-vafue-of-equity.
SP is the ratio of sates-to-market-value-of-equity. OP is the ratio of operating-income-b-market-value-
of-equity. OP is the ratio ol dividends-to-market-value-of-equity. GE. GC. GS. and GO refer to pro-




1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
AB1 .021 .025 .011 .019 .013 .007 .010 .019-.002 -.028
AB2 016 .017 .032 .018 .019 .013 .005 .007 000 -015
AB3 .020 .030 .022 .021 .018 .015 .003 .015-.006 -.022
AB4 .032 .026 .031 .026 .019 .017 .003 -.002 007 -.025
AB5 .020 .038 .028 .034 .006 .020 .017 .003 .003 -.028
AAB .022 .027 .025 .024 .015 .015 .008 .008 .000 -.024
CABS .114 .144 .131 .123 .078 .075 .040 .042 .002 -.113
CS 1.434 1.4351.3641.3141.205 1.206 1.144 1.1361.057 .818
B. CHARACTERISTICS OF DECILES
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 6 9 10
BM 1184 1.1941.1141.054 .990 .945 .900 .842 .760 .638
Size 198.3332,3388.4413.2461.4499.2508.6536.5567.2 545.1
EP -.029 .036 .055 .072 .079 .087 .087 .090 .092 .086
CP .078 .143 .153 .165 .169 .172 .167 .167 .160 .147
SP 4.2804.1003.69934413.1593.0312.9282.8582.616 2.227
OP .203 .275 .285 .292 .295 .299 .292 .293 .261 .259
OP .023 .032 .033 .035 .035 .034 .033 .030 .026 .019
GE -.187 -.019 .008 .043 .053 .075 .079 .099 .116 .141
GC -.022 .032 .047 .071 .087 .097 .109 .127 .152 198
GS -.035 001 015 .026 .040 .050 .061 074 .092 .125
GO -.028 .007 .023 .032 .049 .062 070 .089 .105 .138TABlE 5; Pottofio Returns and CharacteristicsBasedon Cash•Flow-to-Pnce and Growth-in-Sales
At lh. end of each April between *968 and 1989,9groupsofstocks are lormed as follows.Allstocks
Sr.independently sorld into 3 groups (bottom 30%. middle 40%, and top 30%) by the ratio of
previous.yoars-cash-flow.to.end.or.April.rnar1eivalue-of..qugy and by the pr.-(ormation-S-y.ar.
weighted.averags-rank-ot-sales.growth. The 9 portfolios ar, intersections resulting from these 2
independent classiRcations. All numbers presented in th. Lable are averages over the 22 formation
periods computed for coi'responding portfolios. ABiisthe sae-adlusted return in year i after formation.
i — 1 S. AA8 is th. averag, over 5-posI-forrnation-years.size-adjusted.retu,n, CA85 is th.
cumufaliv. over S-po$t-formation-y.ars'.siz.-adjusl,d.r.turn. C5 is th. cumulative over 5-post-formation-
years-raw-return. 8M. SLz., EP. CP. SP, OP. and OP. d&ln..d below. use end-ol-April-rnaikM.value-of.
squity and prelor'mation-y.ar-accounting. WA Is lb. ratio of book-value-ot-.qufty-to.m.mie.vaiuec,t.
equity. Size is the total-dollar value of equity (in mdllons. EP is the ratio of earnings.to.market-valu.ol-
equity. CP Is th. ratio of cash-Aow-to-maric.t-valueof-.quity. SP Is th, ratio of s.ales-to-marlret-valu.of.
.qulty. OP l U. ratio of op,rating-lncoms-to-mark.t-value.o(..qudy. OP Ii the ratio of divid,nds-to-
mark.t-v.lueof-.quity. GE. GC. OS. and GO refer to pr fOrmation.5.year-average.growgi rates of
earnings, cash Row. sales, and operating incom., raspectwely.
A. RETURNS
Glamour
CP 1 1 I 2 2 2 3 3 3
CS 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
*81 .005 -.015 -.027 .028 .008 -.005 .054 .050 .007
*82 -.015 -.022 -.040 .031 .020 .017 .054 .026 .011
A83 -.011 -.0*6 -.036 .031 .023 .000 .048 .026 003
*84 -.006 -.024 -.036 .030 .006 .011 .061 041 .011
*85 .005 -.021 -.029 .030 .013 -.010 .056 .036 .023
AA8 -.006...() -.033 .030 .014 .003 .054 .036 .008
CABS -.032 -.094 -.156 .160 .074 .013 .304 .193 .041
CS 1.122 .843 .712 1.419 1.200 1.076 1.711 1.497 1.163
B. CHARACTERISTICS OF DECII.ES
CP 1 I 1 2 2 2 3 3 3
GS * 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
GM .898 .566 .385 1.074 .583 .710 1.414 1.269 1.148
Size 273.0 589.4 681.0 380.2 488.0 495.1 389.9 444.3 360.9
EP .020 .046 .054 085 .097 .100 .114 .134 .142
CP .077 .084 .080 .166 .163 .159 .279 .278 .285
SP 2.450 1.539 1.115 3.200 2.571 2446 5.279 4.604 4.470
Op .144 .148 .139 .270 .275 .274 .449 .463 .487
OP .022 .020 .014 .036 .035 .024 039 .042 .031
GE -.063 .069 .142 .050 .086 .142 .082 *08 .143
CC .018 .121 205 .051 .097 .205 .047 .067 .140
GS -.016 .053 .112 .007 .057 .105 013 056 .106
GO -.028 .059 .131 .019 .068 .131 035 .075 .116TABLE 6: Portfolio Returns and Characteristics Based oi, Earnung.to. Price and Giowth-in-Sal.s
Al the end of each April beeeo 1968 and 1989. 9 groups of stocks are formed as follows. All stocks
are independently soiled info 3 groups (bottom 30%. middle 40%. and top 30%) by the ratio 01 previous
year's earnings to end-ofAprd-marhetvalue-of-equity and by the pre-Iormatuon-5.year.weighted.average-
rank.of-sal.s.glowth. The 9 poiltolios ar. intersections resulting from these 2 independent
classil%cations. All numbers presented m the table are averages over the 22 tormation periods
computed for corresponding portfolios. ABi is the sizeadjusled return in year i after formation.
= I 5. khiB the average over S-posl-tormalion-years'-suze adjusted-return. CABS is the
cumulative over 5-post.formation.years.size-adjusted-relurn. C5 is the cumulat,v• over 5-post-formation-
y.acs.raw.r.turn. BM, Size. EP, CP. SR. OP. and OP. deftned below, use end-of-April-market-value-of-
equity and pr.-foimation-year-accounling. BM is the ratio of book-value-of-equity-to.-marlre-value-of-
equity. Siz, is the total-dollar value of equity (in millions). ER is the ratio of earnings.to.rnarket.value.of.
equity. CP is th. ratio of cash-ftow.to-market-value-ol-equity. SP is the ratio of sales-Io-market-valueol-
equity. OP is the ratio of operating-incometo-market-value-of-equity. DR is the ratio of dividends-to-
marllet.vatue-of-.quEty. GE. GC. GS, and GO refer to pre-Iormation-5.year.averagegrowih rates of
earnings, cash flow, sales, and operating income, respectNely.
A. RETURNS
Glamour Value
EP I I 1 2 2 2 3 3 3
GS 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
ABI .020 •00I .024 .028 .005 -.002 .051 .043 .020
AB2 -.004 -.016 -.035 .038 022 .011 .041 .026 .015
AB3 -.002 -.012 -.034 .043 .018 .008 .026 .021 .010
A94 .003 -.013 •045 .027 .009 .002 .051 .041 .019
A85 007 .012 -.045 .028 .012 -.008 .029 .039 .019
.005 -.011 -.037 .033 .013 .002 .040 .034 .017
CABS .024 -.053 -.170 .174 .067 .009 .216 .162 .087
CS 1,315 .966 .674 1.533 1.230 1,063 1.716 1523 1.365
B. CHARACTERISTICS OF DECILES
1 I 2 2 2 3 3 3
GS I 2 3 I 2 3 I 2 3
BM 1.077 756 .454 1.127 889 .692 1.409 1.252 1.129
Size 264.0 502.6 702.0 424.8 543.0 5684 354.9 431.8 400.5
EP 044 049 .051 lot 099 095 .154 .152 .158
CR .133 t16 093 .186 .173 155 268 257 260
SR 3.236 2.280 1 365 3.257 2.518 2.239 3.607 4.169 4.040
OP 213 .195 .157 .299 .264 .262 .432 .429 .450
OP 022 021 014 040 .038 027 .042 045 .035
GE .028 105 187 070 .105 161 097 120 .169
GC .025 094 181 061 .096 153 074 .103 .163
OS 000 070 .152 024 .077 140 .025 071 139
GO .020 090 182 .047 .092 .155 .059 097 .160TABLE 7: Portfolio Returns and Characteristics Bas.d on Book-to-MarketandGrowth-in-Sales
At the end of each April between 1968 and ¶989, 9 groups of stocks are formed as follows. All stocks
vs indep.ndently sorted into 3 groups (bottom 30%, middla 40%. and top 30%) by the ratio 01 end.of-
pr.v.ous-yea's-book.vslue-of-equity-to-end-of-April.mark.t.value.of..quity and by the pre-focmation.5.
year-w.ighl.d•avvage-rank-olsales-growlh. The 9 portfolios ar. inteaections resulting from hess 2
independent classifications. AH numbers presented in th, tabl, are averages over th• 22 formation
periods computed for corresponding portfolios. ABi is th. siz.-adgusted return in year i after formation.
1 5. frAB is the average over 5-post-formation-years-si.-adjusted-return. CAB5 is the
cumulaiN. over S-post.fofmation-years'.szsadlusted.retum. CS is the Cumulative over 5-post-formation-
years'-raw'return. OM. Size. EP. CP, SP. OP. and DP. defined below, use .nd-of.April-mark,t.valu..o(.
equity and pr..lormation.y.ar..ccounting. BU is th. ratio of book.vafueol-equity.lo-mark.t.valus.ol.
equity.Siz, isthe total-dollar value of .quity (in millions). EP is th, ratio of earnings-to.market-valu.-ol-
equity. CP Is the ratio of cash-flow-to-mark.t-value-of..qudy. SP is the ratio of sales-to-mark.t•value-of-
equity. OP is th. ratio of operating'incometo.markel-value-of.equity. DP is the ratio of dividends-to-
market.valu.-of..quity. GE. GC. OS. and GO refer to pr.-lormation-5.year.average-growth rates of
earnings, cash flow. sales, and operating income, respectively.
A. RETURNS
Glamour Value
SM 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 3
OS 1 2 3 1 2 3 I 2 3
*81 -.003 -.005 -.013 .010 009 -.026 .038 .038 .003
A82 -.017 -.007 -.019 .016 .019 .000 .036 016 .021
*83 -.017 •006 -.021 .024 .017 -.016 .037 028 .017
*84 -.007 -.020 -.023 .028 .014 •005 .044 033 .034
*85 -.001 -.019 -.029 .034 .018 .003 .041 .037 .009
AAS -.009 -.012 -.021 .022 .015 -.009 .039 .030 .017
CABS -.044 -.058 -.100 .116 .079 -.04.3 .213 .160 .081
CS .974 .925 .842 1.325 1.224 .990 1.016 1.387I_lit
R36 .719 .966 1.387 .378 .500 .616 .048 .131 .129
B. CHARACTERISTICS OF DECILES
SM I I 1 2 2 2 3 3 3
GS ¶ 2 3 1 2 3 I 2 3
BM .425 .4-40 .392 .912 884 .849 166 1 55 1.50
Size 514.7 749.8 704.2 4.32.7 477.1 449.0 199.0 2843 274.9
EP .018 .064 .068 .065 099 .111 .026 092 .115
CP .074 .106 .105 .145 ¶60 .194 .160 226 .248
SP I 966 ¶490 ¶360 2.738 2.650 2.861 5.400 5237 5.287
OP .160 .179 .176 253 303 337 312 414 .477
OP .019 .022 .016 035 037 .029 033 038 .033
GE .083 .122 .159 .040 081 118 067 039 068
CC .177 177 180 .099 103 098 .013 026 040
CS -.020 .060 020 .tOl 056 003 .107 053 003
GO .034 095 ¶43 023 066 III 002 026 040TABLE 6:Summary of 0,cde Returns for the Largest 50% of Stocks
Althe end of each Aprilbetween1968 and 1969. th. largest SO percent of stocks by market
capitalization at that time sr• soiled IntO 9 Or 10 groups. In panel 1,ilocksare sorted Into
deciles by (hi pr.-(ormation-5-year-weighled.av.rage-rank.oI.sales growth. In panel 2. stocks are
soiled into deciles by th. ratio of last-year's-cash.ffow.to-end.of.April-makel.vatueof..quify. The
9 portfolios Cr. intersections resulting from these 2 independent classifications. In panel 3. all
stocks are independently sorted Into 3 groups (bottom 30%. middle 40%. and top 30%) by the
ratio of previous-years-cash-Ilow-to-end-of-ApnI-market-value-of-equityandby the preformation.
S-year.weighted-average-rank-ot-salesgrowth. Th. 9 portfoliosan, intersections resulting from
thesi 2 independent classifications. Inpanel4, Stocks an.sorted intodeciles by the ratio oflast-
years-book-value-oI-equity-Io-end-of-Aprd-market-valu.-oI-equity. In panel 5.stocks are sorted
into docites by th, ratio of tast-years-earnings-to-end-ol-Aprd-martret-valueof-.quity. In panel 6.
all stocks a,. independently sorted into 3 groups (bottom 30%. middle 40%. and top 30%) by the
ratioof pr.vious-year's-earnings-to-.nd-ot-April.marliet-valueof-equity and by the pr,-fonmation-5.
year-weighted.average-rank-of-sales growth. The 9 portfolios are inlerseclions resulting from
hess 2 independent classifications.Alt numbers presented inthe table Cr. averages over the 22
formation periods computed for corresponding portfolios. AAB is th. average over 5-post.
Iormation-years.size-adjustedreturn. CABS is the cumulative over5-post-Iormation-years-size
adjusted.CS isthe cumulative over S-post.lofmation.yeans'.raw return.
CS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
AAB .031 .036 .021 .023 .012 .009 -.003 000-006.036
CABS .166 .194 .111 .123 .060 043-.016.000 -.02? -.169
CS 1.247 1,321 1.188 1.1991116 1.073 1.010 .999 .968 .705
CP 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 6 9 10
AAB -.052 -.030 -.007 .003 .015 .016 .017 022 .030 .029
CAB5 -.235 -.142 -.034 .014 .078 080 .06? 116 158 .156
CS .504 723 935 1.019 1.138113611431.1631223 1.243
CP 1 1 I 2 2 2 3 3 3
CS I 2 3 I 2 3 1 2 3
AAB .001 -.020-039 .030 .010 001 .048 021-.010
CABS .007 -.097 -.181 160 .052 002 263 .110-.049
CS 1.094 .799 .654 1.270 1.106 1.0401.3281226 .934
BM 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 6 9 10
AB -.043 -.016 .001 .002 .007 .007 .017 .026 036 .022
CABS -198 -077 .007 012 036 .036 .088 .14-6 .193 .113
CS .566 865 1.020 1.018 1.051 1.075 1.149 1.2291.303 1.121
EP 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 6 9 10
A.AB -042 -028 011 003 005 .011 .020 .027 029 015
CABS -194 -131 -052 015 .026 053 .106 .145 153 075
CS .564 704 .887 1.016 1.026 1.085 1.203 1.249 1.251 1.127
EP I I I 2 2 2 3 3
I 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
CAB 012 -.011-037 .034 012-.002 046 .031 .007
CABS 059 -052 -.174 .164 .061 -.012 .252 .162 .036
C5 1,176 694 631 1307 1.126 997 1.3441.301 1.124TABLE 9: Regression of Returns on Characteristics for All Firms
At the end of each April between 1968 and *989. w. comput, for every (tim in the sample the i-year-holding-period
relurn starling at th. endofApril. We then run 22 cross sectional regressions withthesereturns for each formation
periodasdependent vriabl,s. The independent variables Irs 1)GS,th. pre-formalion-5-year-weighted.av.rag.-rank-
of-sales growlh:2) SM.th. ratio of end-ol-previous-y.ars-bool-valueof-.quily-to-market-valu.-ol.,qu,ty; 3) Size, the
end-ofApril-natural-logarthm-of-maket-value-ol-equity (in millions): 4) EP+ equaltoEP--the ratio of pr,vlous.years-
•arnings-to-.nd-of-Aprd-mark.l-valu.-ol- equity--if EP is positive--and to zero if EP is negatrve; 5) DEP equal to 1 if EP is
negative, and to zero if EP is positive; 6) CP+. equaltoCP--tha ratio of previous-years-cash-flow-to-.nd-of-April-market-
value-of-equity--if CP is postive- andtozero ifCPis negative: 7) DCP. .qualto1 if CR is negative, and to zero if CR is
positive. The raport.dcoefficientsare averages over the 22 founation periods. The reported I-statistics an, based on
the cross-sectional varianc, of the 22 coefficients.
NT GS BM SIZE EP+ DEP CP+ DCP
Mean .160 -.061




T. ST. 2.140 -1.095
Mean .110 .526
T. ST. 2.029 2.54*
Mean .099 .356
T.ST. 1.673 4.240
Mean .129 -.058 .006 301 -.029
1. ST. 2.584 -2.832 .330 3.697 -I222
Mean .14.3 009 -.009 280 -.032
T.ST. 1.562 .565 -1.148 4.223 -1.625
Mean .169 -.044 000 -.oog 296 -036
1.ST. 1947 -2.125 005 -1.062 4553 .1 625
Mean 172 -051 016 -.009 394 032
T. ST. 196* -2.527 1 036 -1.065 2.008 1 940TABLE 10: Past Expected, and Future Growth: Glamour - Value
Panel t At lb. end ci each April between 1966 and 1Q89. 10 decile portfolios ar, formed based on the ratio
of end.of.pr.viou,year,.book.valueOt-eqUitY.tO.end.of.AprIl.markef.value.of.equily (BM). For each decde
portfolio, we coinput. I) lb. average past 5.year-growth rat, of sales, earnings, operating income, and cash
flow of the portfolio: 2) the future growlh rate in years + +5 of sales, earnings, operating income, and
cash flow ol hi portfolio; and 3) the ratio of last years earnings, operating income and cash flow to end-of-
April.market-valueequity.of-thO'POrtfoliO. Th, table presents the average over 22 lormation periods
diflei'ence in aN thes. variables between the lowest BM (gtamour) and highest BM (value) decile portfolios.
Panel 2 At the end of each April between 1966 and 1Q89, 9 portfolios of stocks are formed as follows. All
stocks Cr. independently soiled unto 3 groups (bottom 30%, middle 40%, and top 30%) by h. ratio of
previous.year's.ca.h-flow-to-end-of-Apri$'rnarkef-valui-of.equuty (CP) and by the preformation-S-year-
wesghted-iveragerank'ot-s.ales growth (CS). The 9 portfolios are intersections resulting horn these 2
independent classifications. For' each portfolio, we compute 1) th, average past 5.year-growlh rate of sales.
earnings, operating income, and cash flow of the portfolio; 2) th. future growth fate lfl years i-i +5 01
sales, earnings. operating income, and cash flow of the portfolio: and 3) the ratio of last year's earnings.
operating Incom.. and cash flow to end-of-April.market-value-equity.of-the-portfoho The table presents the
average over 22 ionnation periods difference in all these variables between the lowest CP. highest CS
(glamour) and highest CP, lowest CS (value) portfolios.
A Past A Expected A I-Year A 2-Year A 3-Year A 4-Year A 5-Year A Average
Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth
P.n.l 1:
Sales .061 X .064 .042 .031 .039 .037 .0.42
Earnings .583 •.025 .1.149 '.553 -.203 •.124 '.108
Operating .231 .226 -.024 -.016 -.004 .012 .015 -.004
Income




Sates .069 X .116 .066 .056 .039 .036 .063
Earnings .060 .060 .276 -.093 -.127 -.025 .022 003
Operating 096 .310 .156 .023 .015 .011 .027 .046
Income
Cash Flow .158 .199 .024 -.015 .020 .017 002 027TABI..E Ii: Raw Returns Consistency: Value- Glamour
Panel I: Al th. end of lath April between1968and 1969. tO docile portfolios are formed based on Iha pro
lormation-5-year-weighted-average-rank-of.sales growth (OS). For each portfolio, I.. 3., and 5yaar-holding.penod
returns are computed. For each formationperiod, panelI reports the difference in the 1-. 3-. and 5-year return
between lb. 2 lowest OS (value) and 2 highest OS (glamour) portfolios.
Panel 2: At the end ol sachAprilbetween 1968 and *989. 10 dec11, portfolios are formed based on the ratio of
pr.vious-year's-cash-flowlo-end-ol-April-market-value.of..quity (CP). For each portfolio, I-. 3-. and S-year.
holding-par iodreturns an, computed. Foreachformation pariod. panel 2 reports the difference in the 1-. 3-. and
5-year return batw..n the 2 highest CP (value) and 2 lowest CP (glamour) portfolios.
Pan.l 3: At the end of eachApril between1968 and 1969. 9 groups of stocks are formed as follows.Allstocks
areindependently sod.d into 3 groups (bottom30%. meddle40%.and top 30%) by the ratio of prevlous.year's-
cash.ftowlo.-snd-o(-April-marlet-valu.-of-equity (CP) and by the pre-formation.5-year.weighted.av.rag.-rank.of.
sales growth(OS).The 9 portfolios ii, intersections resulting from these 2 independent classiScateons. For each
portfolio, 1-. 3-. and 5-ysar.holding-period returns are computed. For each formation period, panel 3 reports the
differenc, in the I-. 3-. and 5-year return between th. lowest OS. highest CP (value) and the highest OS. lowest
CP (glamour) portfolios.
Panel 4: At th, end of each April between 1968 and 1Q89. 10 dec11, portfolios Sr. formed based on the ratio of
.nd.of.pnevius.y.ars.bokvalueof..quy.toend.of.Api'ilmarket.valueof..quy(BM) For each portfolio, 1-, 3-.
and 5-year-holding-p.niod returns are compuled. For each formation period, panel 4 reports the diffenanc. m the
1-, 3-. and 5-year return between the highestSM(value) and lowest SM (glamour) docile portfolios.
PANEL I PANEL 2 PANEL 3 PANEI,.4
OS: 1.2.9. 10 CP: 9, 10. 1.2 GS-CP: 3, 1 - 1.3 SM: 9.10- 1.2
1 3 5 I 3 5 1 3 5 1 3 5
Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year YearYearY,ar
1968 .130 .041-.016 .022 .287 .474 .144 .153 .267 .098 .201 .344
1969 .070•.097 .126 .123 .195 .410 .065-.143 .263 .074 .070 .303
1970-.108 .037 .193 .135 .246 .420 .002 160 .356 .023 .032 .279
1971-.059 .061 .231-.076 .231 .470.144 .196 .531'.108 .156 .463
1972 .074 .249 .544 .155 .319 .693 .134 .362 .932 .098 326 .764
1973 .156 424 .765 .021 .382 .846 .152 .7021.416 .042 .450 .925
1974 .122 .488 .944-.007 .4961.343 .069 .6501.597 .050 .6421.726
1975 .261 .564 .311 .262 .6161,310 .379 1.1151.229 .4181.0341.182
1976 .030 IOg-.035 .174 .6731.468 .217 .7151.235 .132 .727 993
1917 .146 .020 .306 .193 .247 .764 .219 .149 .844 .195 .161 .614
1976-.002'.029 .498 .04.8-.106 .272 .039 -.072 .581 037-.264 .286
1979-.062 .013 .332-.168-.102 274-.176 .098 .757-.207•.123 .569
1980-.012 .650 .929 .039 .7451.225 .110I 2462.000-.0341.066I 676
1981 .154 .5121.165 .203 .6501.584 .236 9402.134 .165 .8101.955
1982 .247 .3941.304 -.032 .3381.253 .118 .5391.866 24-0 .5891.477
t963 .050 .167 .359 .204 332 .85* .252 .5781.470 221 .256 648
1984 -.126-.090 .109 .192 552 .888 .052 .641 1.092 043 .324 .640
1965-061 .190 .301 014 322 576-032 531 708-007 237 299
1986 .149 .288 .108 339 196 .427 051 149
1987 .075 .175 .093 .170 .111 .290 078 .015
1988 -.009 092 069 -037
1989 -010 -063 010 207TABLE 12: Siz.-Ad1usted Relurns Consistency; Value - Glamour
Panel I: At th. end of each April between $968 and ¶989. 10 docile porilolios are formed based on the pre-
Iormation.S.y.ar.weighl.daverag-raflk-OI-Salesgrowth(GS). For each portfolio.I-,3., and S-year holding-
period-sI.z.-adlusted returnS are computed. For each formation period, panel I reports the ditlerence in the I-. 3-,
and 5-year siz.-adiusted return between lb. 2 lowest CS (value) and 2 highest CS (glamour) portfolios.
Panel 2: At the end of each April between 1968 and 1989. 10 decile portfolios are formed based on the ralio of
previous.year's.c.ash.f)ow.to-efld-OlAPrIimarket-Value-Ol-eqUify (CR). For each portfolio. I.. 3-. and 5-year-
holdlng-period-siz.adlusted returns are comput.d. Fot each formation period, panel 2 reports the difference in
the 1-. 3-. and 5-yeer-size-adjusled return between the 2 highest CR (value) and 2 lowest CP (glamour) portfolios.
Panel 3: At h• .nd of each April between $968 and 1989.9 groups of stocks are formed as follows. All stocks
at. independently soiled into 3 groups (bollOm 30%, middls 40%. and top 30%) by the ratio of previous-year's-
cash-ftow-to-.nd-of• Api-il.mar1et-vatue-of-equity (CR) and by the pre-lormation.5.year-weighted-average-rank-of-
sales-growth (OS). The 9 portfolios are intersections resulting from these 2 independent classifications. For each
portfolio. 1.. 3-, and 5.year.holding-period-size-adjusted returns are computed. For each formation period, panel
3 repoils the dillerenc• in the I-, 3-. and 5-year'si.ze-adjustad return between the lowest OS. highest CP (value)
and lh. highest OS, lowest CR (glamour) portfolios.
Panel 4: At the end of each April between 1968 and 1989. 10 decile portfolios are formed based on the ratio of
end-of-pr.vious.year's-book-value-ol-equity-lo-end-of-April-markel-vatue-of-equity(BM). For each portfolio, 1-. 3-.
and 5.year.holding-peiiod-size--adjusted returns are computed. For each formation period, panel 4 reports the
difference in the 1-, 3-, and 5-year-size-adjusted return between the highest BM (vatue) and lowest BM (glamour)
decite portfolios.
PANEL I PANEL 2 PANEL 3 PANEL 4
OS; 1,2-9. 10 CP: 9, 10- 1,2 OS-CR: 3, 1 - 1.3 BM: 9. tO. 1, 2
1 3 5 1 3 5 1 3 5 1 3 5
Yea, Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year
1968 .06* .037 046 014 .271 .455 .105 .129 .297 .049 .189 .356
1969 .10*-.055 .200 .104 .162 .353 .085-.129 .332 .095 .092 .336
1970-.117 .083 255 .124 .291 .463-.017 .243 .451 .002 .119 387
1971 -.060 .148 .281 -.078 .250 .509-.145 .266 .567-.110 .240 .529
1972 .127 .306 590 .175 .337 .721 .214 .4531.003 .171 420 .855
1973 .176 .4-04 .658 .04.3 .33* .593 .180 .6441.165 .082 .387 .587
1974 .128 369 .508-001 .299 .648 .078 .405.7.3 .062 .406 .845
1975 .130 .161-307 .134 .365 .640 .191 .469 .238 .213 .388 .237
1976 019-184 -.709 .148 .4681.012 .163 .324 .381 .110 .356 .168
¶977 .014 -.203 -.162 .079 .064 .382 .037 -.152 .230 .020 -.108 -.012
1978 .049-225 -216 .036 -147 083 -001 -.235 .002
-003 -.414 -.341
1979 -051 -048 .061 -163 -.135 .122 -.163 .056 .4.46 -193 -.201 .111
1980-077 291 618 -001 .550 1.029 .038 .874 1.653 -.113 .6381.268
1981 .140 .305 I 034 198 .623 1.536 .222 .776 2.000 .170 .621 1.808
1982 .062 248 1239 -058 3081212 •.008 .417 1.823 .078 .4.491.399
1963 032 249 550 .207 .300 .757 .235 .619 1.574 207 .311 .763
1984-076 062 431 182 475 762 084 756¶ 279 .076 .410 .795
1965 -055 285 498 014 328 566 016 604 815 026 .357 .544
1966 167 392 .101 322 209 .496 077 .291
1967 .104 268 .102 .192 .132 .361 118 .149
¶988 029 105 .119 020
¶989 031 . 045 045 . 130TABLE 13: Perlormanc. of Portlolios in But- and Worst-Stock-Mai-l,ieI Months
All months in the sampl, are divided into 25-wot-stock-ielurn months based on the equally-weighted index
W25). th, remaining 88-negative months other than th. 25-worst (N88), th. 122-positiv, months other than
the 25-best (P122). and th. 25-best months (B25) in th. sample.
Panel 1: Al the end of each April between *968 and 1989. 10 decile po11otios are formed based on the pre-
loimation-5-year-weighted-av.rage-rank-o-sal.s growth (GS). For each docile p0111db (changing every
April), panel 1 presents its averag, return over the W25. Nba. P122, and B25 months.
Panel 2: At the .nd 04 .ach April between1968and *989, 10 docile po1lolios are formed based on th, ratio
of previous-year's-cash-I ow-to-.nd-ol-April.market-valu.-of-equay (CP). For each decile portfolio (changing
every April), panel 2 presents Its average return over the W25, Nba. P122. and 625 months,
Panel 3: At th. end of .ach April between 1966 and 1969. 9 groups of stocks are formed as followe. All
stocks are independently sorted into S groups (bottom 30%. middle 40%, and top 30%) by the ratio of
previous-years-cash-bow-Io-end-of-April.market-value-of-equity (CP) and by the pre-formation-5-year-
weighted-.v.rag.-rank-of.sales growth (GS). The 9 poillolios are intersections resulting from these 2
independent classiñcations. For each portfolio (changing every April). panel 3 presents its averag. return
over the W25, P-lee, P122, and 825 months.
Panel 4: At the end of each April between 1968 and 1989, 10 decile portfolios are formed based on the ratio
of end-ol-previous-year's-b ok-valu.-of-.quity-lo.snd.of.April.market.yalue-o(.,quiry (BM). For each portfolio
(changing every April). panel 4 presents its averag, return the W25. Nba. P122. and 825 months.
Panel I:
GS I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10Index
W25 -.104-.092-.094-.091-.068-094-.093-.093-.101 -.110-.102
P488 -.020-.017-.0*8-.019 -.020-.019 -.021 •.023 -.026 -.031 -.023
P122 .042 .039 .039 .038 .036 .037 .037 .039 .038 .038 .037
825 .134 .116 .115 .110 .106 .110 .114 .113 .1*4 .124 .121
P.n.l 2:
CP I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 *0 Index
W25 -.118 -.111 -.106-.103 -.097-.095-.090 -.067-.088 -.098 -.102
N88 -.030-.028 -.027 -.024 -.023 -.021 -.020-.019 -.016 -.020-.023
P122 .037 .039 .040 .038 .039 .056 .036 .038 .037 .038 .037
825 .121 .125 .122 .119 .116 .109 .112 .115 .119 .138 .121
Glamour Value
Panel 3:
CP 1 2 3 I 2 3 1 2 3 Index
3 3 3 2 2 2 I I 1
W25 •.103 -.100-.105 -.103
-091 -.080-.114-.090- 066 -.102
Nba -.029 -.025 -.022 -.025 -.020 -.016 -.023 -.016 -.0*5 -.023
P122 .038 .039 .038 .039 .036 .038 .039 .040 .040 .037
825 .110 .115 .124 III .104 .113 .131 .110 124 .121
Panel4:
BM I 2 3 4 5 6 7 6 9 10 Index
W25 -.112-.110 -.104-.100-097 -.091-093-.092-.098-.102-.102
N88 -.029-.028-.026-.025-.023-.020-.021 -.020-0I8-022-.023
P122 .036 .040 .039 .037 .036 .037 .036 .037 038 .039 .037
625 .114 .114 .119 .113 .112 .113 .118 .126 .133 .148 .121TABLE 14: Pe,lormanc. of Portfolios in Best and Worst Ouailer, Based on Real-GNP Growth
One Quarter Ahead
All quarter, in th, sample a,. divided into 4 sell: 10 quarters of the lowest-real-GNP growth
dunng lh. sample period. 34-flext-lowest.real.GNP.growth quarters. 34-next-worst growth
quarters, and 10-highest-roal.GNP-growlh quarters.
Panel I: Al the end of each April between 1966 and 1989. 10 decilo portfolios ar, formed based
onthepr.-tormation-5-year•weighted-average-rank-oI'-sales-growtpi (GS). For each docile
portfolio (changing every April). panel 1 presents its average ,elurn in the quarter prior to the 10-
worst. 34-next. 34-next, and 10-best quarters ranked by ,eal.GNP growth.
Panel 2: At th, end of each Aprilbetween1968 and 1969, tOdecil.portfolios are formed based
on the ratio of previous-yaar's'cash-flow-toend-ol-April-mar*cet.valu.-ol.equily (CP). For each
docileportfolio (changingevery April),panel 2 presents its averag, return in the quarter prior to
th.lOworit, 34-next, 34-next, and 10-best quarters ranked by real-GNP growth.
Panel 3:Atthe end of each April between 1968 and 1989, 9 groups of stocks are formed as
follows. All stocks are independently sorted into 3 groups (bottom 30%. middle 40%. and lop
30%) bythe ratio ofprevious-year's-cash.flow-to-end.of-April-ma -valu..oI..quity(CP) and by
the pre-formalion-5-year-weightld.average-rank.ot.s.ales.growth (GS). Th. 9 portfolios Sr.
intersections resulting from these 2independent classifications.For each (changing every April)
portfolio, panel 3 presents its average return in th. quarter prior' to the 10-worst. 34-next, 34-next,
and 10-best quarters ranked by real.GNP growth.
Panel 4: At the end of each April between 1968 and 1989. 10 dec11, portfolios a,. formed based
on the ratio of end-of-previous-years.book.value.of-equity.toend.of.Aprd..market.valu..otequjty
(BM). For eachportfolio(changing every April). panel 4 presents itsaverag,return in the quarter
prior to the 10-worst. 34-next. 34-next, and 10-best quarters ranked by real-GNP growth.
P.ri.I 1:
GS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9I0GNP
Wor,t 10 .040 .038 .022 .022 .020 007 .017.012.001-.005 -.017
Next Worst 34 .022 .017 .015 .017.009.016 .017.019.010.003.000
Next Best 34 .033 .036 .035 .037 .036 .033 .033.033.031.023.012
Beat 10 .140 .133 .120 .121 .125 .123 .123.124.127.109.031
P.n.l 2:
CP I 2 3 4 5 6 78 9IOAGNP
Worst b 003 .007 .004 .017 .018 016 .020.025.019.015•.017
Next Worst 34 .001 .007 .0*3 .009 .013 .014 .009.016.020.016.000
Next Best 34 017 .025 .031.030 .034.031 .036.041.041.042.012
Best 10 .101 .118t17 .124 .128 .132 .136.134.135.132.031
Glamour Value
Panel 3:
I 2 3 1 2 3 I 2 3 GNP
3 3 3 2 2 2 1 1 I
Worst to -.009 .013 .006 .014 .016 .020 .032.037.041 -.017
Next Worst 34 .011 .011 .012 .010 .014 .023.021.018.027 .000
Next Best34 026 .029 .034 .029 .033 .046 026.040.046 .012
Best 10 .103 .123 .136 .107 .123 .133 .122.140.139 .031
P.n.l 4:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 6 910GNP
Worst tO -.004 .001 .012.018 .009016.017.028.021.015-.017
Next Worst 34 .011 .008 .011 .009 .000.010.010.016.017.012 .000
Next Best 34 .022 .028 .027 .025 .030.035.036.035.041.039 .0t2
Best 10 .092 .102 .118 .117 .117 .135 .132.141.145.151 .03*TABLE 15: Performanc, of Portfolio,inBest and Worst Ouai'ter* Based on Change in Unemployment
On. Qusrt.r Ahead
All quarters in the sample ere dnrided into 4 sets: 10 quart.rs of the highest growth of unemployment
during the sample period. 34-next-higPlest-unemploym.nt.growjh quarters, 34-next-highest-
unemployment.growth quarters, and I 0-lowest.unomploym.nt.growth quarters.
Panel I: At the sod of .ach April between 1968 and 1989. 10 docile portfolios are formed based on
the pre-fomation-5-year-weIghted.averag.ranko(.utes.grc) (GS). Foreachdocil, portfolio
(changing every April). pan.l I presents it. averag, return in the quarter prior to the 10-worst, 34-
next. 34-next,andI0-b.st quarters ranked by unemployment growth.
Pan.f 2: At the end of each April between 1968 and 1989. 10 decile portfolios are formed based on
the ratio of prey us-yeer's-cash.flow.to.end.oI-April.maket.yaau..of.qu (C?). For each docile
portfolio (changing ivry April), panel 2 presents its averag, return in the quarter priorto theto-
worst. 34-next, 34-n.xt. and 10-best quarters ranked by unemployment growth.
Panel 3: At th. end of each April between 1968 and 1989. 9 groups of stocks are formed as follows.
All stocksare Independentlysorted into 3 groups (bo6om 30%, middle 40%. sod top 30%) by th.
ratio of previous-year's.cash.floto-end.ol.April.ma ke value-of.equity (CP) and by the preformation-
5-year-weighlerl-averagI-rank.of-sales.growtJ(GS). The 9 portfolios are Intersections resulting from
these 2 indepindent classifications. For each portfolio (changing evify April), panel 3 presents its
average return in the quarter prior to the 10-worst,34-next.34-next, md ID-best quarters ranked by
unemployment growth.
Panel 4: At the end of each April between 1966 and 1989. 10 docile portfolios are 104-med based on
the ratio of end.ofprevious.year's.book.valu.ofequiy1o.nd.of.April.m*rke,.valueo,er1uip, (SM).
For each portfolio (changing every April). panel 4 presents its average return in the quarter prior to
the 10-worst. 34-next. 34-next, and 10-best quarters ranked by unemployment growth.
P.nel 1:
Worst 10 .016 .028 .014 .022 .019 .018 015.013.006.013 .008
Next Worst 34 .023 .027 .026 .028 .024 .023 .026.029.024.015 .001
Next Best34 .059 .047 .044 .045 .044 .044 .042044.040.030-002
Best 10 .077 .072 .062 .059 .051 .050 .053.050.043.031 .005
Panel 2;
C? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 6 9l0Unemp
Worst 10 .0lI .012 .008 .014 .016 .014 .013.022.020.019 .006
Next Wor*t 34 .014 .021.021 .022 029 .026 .025.030.029.023 .001
Next Best 34 .035 .036 044 .041 040 .04 I.043.048.049.050 .002
Best 10 .014 030 .044 .048 .051 .057 .065.067.075085 -.005
Glamour Vahie
Panel 3:
cP 1 2 3 1 2 3I 2 3 Unemp GS 3 3 3 2 2 2 I I I
Worst 10 .008 .016 .002 .004 .015.032 007.021.027 .008
Next Worst 34 .023 .028 024 .021 .026 .031 .017.033034 .001
Next Best 34 .036 .036 .043 .044 .041 .052 .047.050.059 .002
Best tO .012 .045 .073 .030 .053 .072 .056.069.087 .005
Panel 4:
M I 2 3 4 S 6 7 6 910 Unemp
Worst 10 -.004 .003 .013 .010 .009 .020 .016.023027.012 .006
Next Worst 34 .023 .020 .022 023 .021 .023 023.030.021018 .001
Next Best 34 .036 037 039 .035 .03.6 .045 043.044050051 -.002
Best 10 .007 029 042 .041 -.005TABIE 16: Risk Characteristics of Portfolios
For each portfolio described below, we compule using 22.y.ar-afle.th.- formationreturnsas observations of its
betawithrespect to thevalu.-wightedindex, We also compute using the 22-foqmat ion periods the standard
deviation of returns and th. standard deviation ofabnormalreturnsin the year after formalion.
Panel I: At the end of each April between 1966 and 1969. 10 docile portfolios are formed based on the pre
formation.5.year.we,ghted.average-raflk-Of-S.aleS-grOWlh (CS). For each decile portfolio, panel t presents Is
beta. standard deviation of returns, and standard deviation of abnormal returns defined above.
Panel 2: Al the end of each April between1968and 1989. 10 decile portfolios are formed based on the ratio of
provious-year's-cash-flow-lo-end.ol-APrd-market'ValUOo-eqUity (CP). For each docile pottOlio, panel 2presents
itsbeta, standard deviation of returns, and standard deviation of abnormal returns defined above.
Panel 3:At the end ofeach April between 1968 and1989. 9 groupsof stocks are formed as follows. All stocks
are independently sorted into 3 group, (bottom 30%. middle 40%, and top 30%) by th, ratio of previous-year's-
cash.flow-to-end-of-April-market-value-of-equity (CP) and by the pre-formation-5-year.weighted-average-rank-of-
sales-growth (GS). The 9 portfolios are intersections resulting from these 2 independent classifications. For
each group of stocks, panel 3 presents its beta, standard deviation of returns, and standard deviation of
abnormal returns defined above.
Panel 4: At the end of each April between 1968 and1989,10 dec11, portfolios are formed based on the ratio of
end.ol.pr.vus-ye.r's-book-value-ol..quity'to-end.of.April.market-value-of-equity (SM). For .ach dec11. portfolio.




CS I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10Index
ft 1.360 1.2611.263 t.232 1.218 1.1801.198 1.264 1.2711.2901.304
Standard deviation .253.230.226.217.213.205.207.210.221.236 .250
Standard deviation of
size-adjusted return .059.052.048.039.031.033.032.036.039.072 —
Equally.
Panel 2: Weighted
CP I 2 3 4 5 6 7 6 9 10Index
p 1.268 1293 1.321 1.333 1.310 1.237 1.182 1.247 1.224 1.3841.304
Standard deviation .224.227.239.237.232.221.212.223.224.252 .250
Standarddeviation of
izeadjustedreturn .037.044.049 .036 .033 .034 .042.036 .04-8.056
Panel 3: Equally.
CP I 2 3 I 2 3 1 2 3 Weighted
3 3 3 2 2 2 I I I Index
I 1.249 1.296 1.2931.2391.1641.2141.3301.2581.322 1.304





SM I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10Index
ft 1.248 1.268 1.337 I 268 1252 1.214 1.267 1.275 1.299 1.4431.304
Slandard deviation .223.223.236.225 221.214.225.233.240.276 .250
Standard deviation of
size-adjusted return .076050040035.031.040.035.043046.071